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Abstract
We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in
pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made
in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentia-
bility, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed
characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).
r 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D51; D41; C78
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1. Introduction
There are two theories of decentralized exchange. The Jevonsian tradition is based
on pairwise interactions and it is explained in terms of exploiting gains from trade
when the marginal rates of substitution of two agents differ. The Edgeworthian
tradition, on the other hand, allows for groups of agents to interact and relies on the
elimination of all coalitional recontracting possibilities. Modern presentations of
both traditions are found in [3–5] and [2], respectively. These contributions describe
decentralized matching and bargaining games whose sets of equilibrium outcomes
coincide with the Walrasian allocations of an exchange economy.
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In this paper, we show that the Walrasian results found in [3,5] (see also [9]) are
robust to the relaxation of many of the assumptions on which it rested.2 Dagan et al.
[2] already set out to make progress in this direction, but their approach was based
on a procedure in which coalitions of any ﬁnite size perform the trades.3 The current
paper rests on even weaker assumptions than those used in [2], and it uses Gale’s [3]
pairwise meetings original procedure.
We argue that the only assumptions on which the decentralization result relies
are continuity and local non-satiation of preferences and a condition to rule
out problems at the boundary of the consumption set. As explained in [7],
there are two key steps in the result: efﬁciency and budget balance. To obtain
efﬁciency, our result is based exclusively on a separation argument—Lemma 6—,
which in the general case exploits the convexifying effects of the continuum: pairwise
efﬁciency implies Pareto efﬁciency (thanks to the boundary assumption).
Budget balance is proved in Lemma 7 making an assumption on the equilibrium
which turns out to be also necessary. The novelty of this assumption is that
it uses deviations of agents that hold their initial endowments (and not only agents
that are about to leave the market, as the earlier published proofs did).4 For
simplicity in the presentation, we write the model and proofs making more
assumptions than the ones we really need, and we discuss in the last section how they
can be dispensed with.
2. The economy
Time is discrete and is indexed by the non-negative integers. There is a continuum
of agents in the market. Each agent is characterized by his initial bundle, and by his
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. The consumption set for each agent is
RLþ; i.e., we consider for now only inﬁnitely divisible goods. Each agent chooses the
period in which to consume, that is, to leave the market. We denote by D the event
for an agent in which he never leaves the market.
For now, we shall make the assumption of a ﬁnite-type economy. That is, the
agents initially present in the market are of a ﬁnite number ‘‘K ’’ of types. The symbol
K also denotes the set of types. All members of any given type k have the same
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and the same initial endowment okARLþþ:
For each type k there is initially a measure nk of agents in the market (withPK
k¼1 nk ¼ 1).
We assume that there exists a continuous function fk :R
L
þ-R that is strictly
increasing and strictly concave on RLþ:
5 We also assume that NofkðxÞofkðokÞ
for every xA@RLþ: Then,
ukðxÞ ¼
fkðxÞ if xARLþ;
N if x ¼ D:
(




Deﬁnition 2. An allocation ðx1;y; xKÞ is Walrasian if there exists a price vector
pa0 such that for all k the bundle xk maximizes uk over the budget set,
fxARLþjpxppokg:
3. The game and the equilibrium concept
We study the model of Gale’s [3,5], as described in [9]. We go over its details at
present.
In every period each agent is matched with a partner with probability aAð0; 1Þ
(independent of all past events). The probability that any given agent is matched in
any given period with an agent in a given set is proportional to the measure of that
set in the market in that period. It follows from this speciﬁcation of the matching
technology that in every period there are agents who have never been matched. The
ﬁnite-type economy, along with this matching technology, implies that even though
agents leave the market as time passes, at any ﬁnite time a positive measure of every
type remains.
Once a match is established, each party learns the type and current bundle of his
opponent. With equal probability, one of them is selected to propose a vector z of
goods, to be transferred to him from his opponent. Let a pair fi; jg be matched and
call i and j the proposer and responder, respectively.
We denote by xi the proposer’s original bundle when this pairwise meeting begins,
and by xj the responder’s original bundle. Suppose that i’s proposal is accepted.
Then, we denote by xi þ z the proposer’s new bundle and by xj  z the responder’s
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new bundle. We require that any proposal result in a net trade z satisfying the
following feasibility condition, xi þ zARLþ and xj  zARLþ: After a proposal is made,
the other party either accepts or rejects the offer.
The market exit rules are as follows. In the event an agent rejects an offer, he
chooses whether or not to stay in the market. An agent who makes an offer, accepts
an offer, or who is unmatched, must stay in the market until the next period: he may
not exit.
There is no discounting. Therefore, an agent who exits obtains the utility of the
bundle he holds at that time. An agent who never exits receives a utility of N:
A strategy for an agent is a plan that prescribes his bargaining behavior for each
period, for each bundle he currently holds, and for each type and current bundle of
his opponent. An agent’s bargaining behavior is speciﬁed by the offer to be made in
case he is chosen to be the proposer and, for each possible offer, one of the actions
‘‘accept’’, ‘‘reject and stay’’, or ‘‘reject and exit’’.
An assumption that leads to this deﬁnition of a strategy is that each agent observes
the index of the period, his current bundle, and the current bundle and type of his
opponent, but no past events beyond his own personal history.6
Like Gale [3–5] and [9], we restrict attention to the case in which all agents of a
given type use the same strategy. As trade occurs, the bundle held by each
agent changes. Different agents of the same type, even though they use the same
strategy, may execute different trades. Thus the number of different bundles held by
agents may increase. However, the number of different bundles held by agents is
ﬁnite at all times. Thus in any period the market is given by a ﬁnite list
ðki; ci; niÞi¼1;y;It ; where ni is the measure of agents who are still in the market in
period t; currently hold the bundle ci; and are of type ki: We call such a list a state of
the market. We say that an agent of type k who holds the bundle c is characterized
by ðk; cÞ:
Associated with each K-tuple of strategies s; one can deﬁne a state of the market
rðs; tÞ ¼ ðki; ci; niÞi¼1;y;It in each period t: Although each agent faces uncertainty, the
presence of a continuum of agents and the symmetry of strategies allow us to deﬁne r
in a deterministic fashion (see [9, pp. 160–161]). For example, since in each period the
probability that any given agent is matched is a; we take the fraction of agents with
any given characteristic who are matched to be precisely a: The reader is referred to
[9] for a description of how to obtain rðs; t þ 1Þ from rðs; tÞ given s:
Deﬁnition 3. A market equilibrium is a particular type of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium: it is a K-tuple s of strategies, one for each type, and the ‘‘state of
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the market’’ beliefs rðs; tÞ both on and off the equilibrium path for each time t;
such that:
* For any trade z; bundles c and c0; type k; and period t; the behavior prescribed by
each agent’s strategy from period t on is optimal, given that in period t the agent
holds c and has either to make an offer or to respond to the offer made by his
opponent, who is of type k and holds the bundle c0; given the strategies of the
other types, and given that the agent believes that the state of the market is
rðs; tÞ:
Each agent is an entity of measure 0 in the continuum and each of them has met
only a ﬁnite number of agents in all the rounds up to round t: A ﬁxed proﬁle of
strategies played by the continuum of agents determines the state of the market in
round t with independence of the actions of such a set of measure 0. This is the
rationale for the beliefs assumed, even after an agent observes deviations from the
equilibrium strategies. It is also easy to see that, in a discretized version of the game,
our equilibria are also sequential equilibria.
4. The theorem
Suppose that the market equilibrium strategy calls for agents characterized by
ðk; cÞ who are matched in period t with agents characterized by ðk0; c0Þ to reject some
offer z and leave the market. These agents are said to be ready to leave the market in
period t:
Theorem 1. At every market equilibrium, each agent of type kAK leaves the market
with the bundle xk with probability 1, where ðx1;y; xKÞ is a Walrasian allocation.
Proof. Consider a market equilibrium. All of our statements are relative to this
equilibrium. All agents of type k who hold the bundle c at the beginning of period t
(before their match has been determined) face the same probability distribution of
future trading opportunities. Thus in equilibrium all such agents have the same
expected utility, Vkðc; tÞ (see footnote 5 again).
Lemma 1. Vkðc; tÞXukðcÞ 8k; c; t:
Proof. Suppose that an agent of type k who holds the bundle c in period t makes the
zero trade offer whenever he is matched and is chosen to propose a trade, and reject
every offer and leaves the market when he is matched and chosen to respond.
Clearly, he is matched and chosen to respond to an offer in ﬁnite time with
probability 1. &
Lemma 2. Vkðc; tÞXVkðc; t þ 1Þ 8k; c; t:
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Proof. By proposing the zero trade and rejecting any offer and staying in the market,
any agent in the market in period t is sure of staying in the market until period t þ 1
with his current bundle. &
Lemma 3. For an agent of type k who holds the bundle c and is ready to leave the
market in period t we have Vkðc; t þ 1Þ ¼ ukðcÞ:
Proof. From Lemma 1, we have Vkðc; t þ 1ÞXukðcÞ: Suppose that Vkðc; t þ
1Þ4ukðcÞ and the circumstances that make the agent leave the market are realized.
Then he would leave with the bundle c and obtain the utility of ukðcÞ: However, he is
better off by deviating and staying in the market until period t þ 1; contradicting his
equilibrium strategy. &
Lemma 4. Suppose that an agent of type k holds the bundle c and is ready to leave the
market in period t: Then it is optimal for him to accept any offer z (of a transfer from
him to the proposer) for which ukðc  zÞ4ukðcÞ:
Proof. If he accepts the offer, from Lemma 1, we have Vkðc  z; t þ 1ÞXukðc  zÞ;
and therefore, Vkðc  z; t þ 1Þ4ukðcÞ: If he rejects the offer, then we have, from
Lemma 3, Vkðc; t þ 1Þ ¼ ukðcÞ: Combining this with the previous inequality, we
obtain the result. &
Lemma 5. For each type kAK ; there exists a period t such that for every tXt there is
a positive measure of agents of type k who are ready to leave the market with the bundle
ck in period t:
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that there is a set of agents of type k with positive measure who
hold the bundle ck and are ready to leave the market in period t
: Given the matching
technology, a positive measure of such agents have been unmatched in any future
time after t and remain ready to leave the market by Lemmas 2 and 3.
Thus, it only remains to show the existence of such t: We argue by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists a type k such that there is no positive measure of agents of
type k ready to leave the market at any time toN: In this case the expected utility of
almost all agents of type k is ukðDÞ ¼ N: On the other hand, given the matching
technology, at any point in time there is a positive measure of agents of type k who
hold ok; and given our assumption about the utility of the initial endowment, they
can be sure of getting the utility of their initial bundle in ﬁnite time by proposing the
zero trade whenever necessary and rejecting the offer and leaving the market as soon
as they are chosen to be responders. &
Lemma 6. Consider any period t such that a positive measure of traders leaves the
market in periods t0pt: Consider the different characteristics of traders ðki; ciÞ for iAIt:
Let EtDIt be the set of characteristics present up to period t for which a positive
measure of agents has left the market. Suppose that for all i ¼ ðki; ciÞAEt; each
member of the exiting set of agents of characteristics i leaves the market in period ti
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with the bundle xi: Then there is a vector pARLþþ that supports the upper contour set of
ui at xi for every iAEt:
Proof. First, we deﬁne the following sets:
Aþi ¼ fzARL j uiðxi þ zÞ4uiðxiÞg
and
Ai ¼ fzARL j uiðxi  zÞ4uiðxiÞg:
It is clear that for all iAIt; Aþi and A
















i are also convex sets.
Note that if zAAþi ; then for any bAð0; 1Þ; bzAAþi ; as follows from convexity and
continuity of preferences. The same observation applies to Ai:
Further, we show now that Aþi -Ai ¼ | for all iAIt: Suppose, contrary to the
claim, that there exist iAIt and zAAþi -Ai: Since zAAi; there exist
ðz1;y; zi1; ziþ1;y; zItÞ with
P
jai zj ¼ z such that ujðxj  zjÞ4ujðxjÞ for all jai:
First, we shall construct a proﬁtable deviation of any agent of characteristic i who is
ready to leave the market with the bundle xi: Using the observation at the end of last
paragraph about Aþi and A





i for all bAð0; 1Þ: Notice
that for every iAIt; xiARLþþ by our boundary assumption. If we take b sufﬁciently




þþ: In other words, in no matter what order he
executes the net trades ðbz1;y; bzi1; bziþ1;y; bzItÞ; his bundle after each of these
trades continues to be feasible. Consider the following deviation by an agent of
characteristic i who is ready to leave the market with the bundle xi:
* The ﬁrst time that he is matched with an agent of characteristic jai who is ready
to leave the market with the bundle xj and if the agent of characteristic i is chosen
to be the proposer, propose the trade bzj:
* Reject any offer and leave the market when he is chosen to be the responder as
soon as he achieves the bundle xi þ bz:
* Otherwise, propose the zero trade, reject every offer whenever necessary, and stay
in the market.
From Lemma 5, there is a positive measure of agents of each characteristic jai
who are ready to leave the market with the bundle xj in every period. In addition,
from Lemma 4, it is optimal for each such agent of each characteristic jai to accept
the offer bzj: Given the matching technology, any agent of characteristic i who is
ready to leave the market with the bundle xi can eventually meet as many agents of
every characteristic jai who are ready to leave the market with the bundle xj as he
wishes. Thus, with probability 1, he can achieve the utility uiðxi þ bzÞ4uiðxiÞ given
the belief that agents of other characteristics follow their equilibrium strategies,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have established that Aþi -Ai ¼ |:
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For the given x; deﬁne the set
fxg ¼ x ¼
X
iAIt
yi for some yiARLþþ
( )
:
Both BðxÞ and fxg are convex sets.
Furthermore, we show now that BðxÞ-fxg ¼ |: Suppose, contrary to the claim,
that their intersection is non-empty. That is, there exist ðy1;y; yItÞ with
P
iAIt yi ¼ x
such that uiðyiÞ4uiðxiÞ for all i: Let yi ¼ xi þ z and yj ¼ xj  zj for all jai: SinceP
iAIt yi ¼ x; we have z ¼
P
jai zj: Then this contradicts A
þ
i -Ai ¼ |:
Therefore, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists pARL and a
constant r such that pxpr and such that for every yABðxÞ; pyXr: Let e40 and
denote by eLARLþþ a vector where all its components are e: By strict monotonicity of
preferences, x þ jItjeLABðxÞ: Taking a sequence of e’s converging to 0, we obtain
that r ¼ px:
Finally, consider an arbitrary yiABiðxiÞ: Clearly, we have that yi þ
P
jai xj þ
jIt  1jeLABðxÞ; and therefore, p½yi þ
P
jai xj þ jIt  1jeLXpx; or pyi þ pjIt 
1jeLXpxi: And again taking a sequence of e-0; we obtain that pyiXpxi: Since
the utility functions are continuous, we have that for every zi such that uiðziÞXuiðxiÞ;
pziXpxi; as we wanted to show. Of course, the fact that pARLþþ comes from strict
monotonicity, now that we know that p supports the upper contour sets at xi for
every characteristic i: &
Lemma 7. Let p; x and the sets Ai be as defined in Lemma 6 and its proof. Let
I ¼ St It be the set of all characteristics present in equilibrium, and let A ¼P
iAI A

i : Let z

i ¼ xi  oi be characteristic i’s net trade in equilibrium. Assume that
for every characteristic i for which pzio0; there exists yiARL small enough, uiðxi þ
yiÞ4uiðxiÞ; for which there exists b40 small enough such that byiAA:
Then, the market equilibrium is payoff equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium
ðp; xÞ:
Proof. For each characteristic i ¼ ðk; cÞAI present in the market, deﬁne the
following set:
Gi ¼ fzARL j uiðoi þ zÞ4uiðxiÞg:
We shall show now that for every iAI ; pziX0; that is, pxiXpoi: We argue by
contradiction. Suppose there exists characteristic i such that pzio0: Consider yi as in
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the statement of the lemma. We have that zi ¼ zi þ yiAGi: Since yi is small enough,
we obtain pzio0 by continuity. Further, by our assumption, we have that there exists
b40 small enough such that bziAA:




j ¼ bzi such that ujðxj 
bz0jÞ4ujðxjÞ for all jAI : Since A is convex and the closure of it contains 0ARL; we
can choose b arbitrarily small. Recall our assumption that oiARLþþ: Hence, if one






þþ: Take the smallest
integer NAN such that bX1=N:
Consider the following deviation by an agent of characteristic i: Instead of
following his equilibrium strategy, he will use this other, starting at the beginning of
the game when he holds his initial bundle oi:
* The ﬁrst N times that he is matched with an agent of characteristic j who is ready
to leave the market with the bundle xj and if the agent of characteristic i is chosen
to be the proposer, offer the trade ð1=NÞz0j:
* Reject any offer and leave the market when he is chosen to be the responder as
soon as he ﬁnishes trading N times with each jAI ready to leave the market, as
prescribed above.
* Otherwise, propose the zero trade, reject every offer whenever necessary, and stay
in the market.
Following this strategy, in no matter what order he executes the net trades
ðð1=NÞz01;y; ð1=NÞz0IÞ; his bundle after each of these trades continues to be feasible.
From Lemma 5, there is a positive measure of agents of each characteristic j who are
ready to leave the market with the bundle xj in every period. In addition, from
Lemma 4, it is optimal for each such agent of characteristic j to accept the offer
ð1=NÞz0j: Given the matching technology, any agent of characteristic i who holds his
initial bundle oi can eventually meet as many agents of every characteristic j who are
ready to leave the market with the bundle xj as he wishes. Thus, with probability 1,
he can achieve the utility uiðoi þ ziÞ4uiðxiÞ given the belief that other agents follow
their equilibrium strategies, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, we have established that for all characteristics i present in the
market pxiXpoi: In addition, recall that p supports the indifference surface at xi:
That is, we have Viðoi; tÞXmaxxARLþ fuiðxÞ j pxppoig: By Lemma 2, we have
Viðoi; 0ÞXmaxxARLþ fuiðxÞj pxppoig:
By efﬁciency of the Walrasian allocations, these inequalities must be equalities.
That is,
Viðoi; 0Þ ¼ max
xARLþ
fuiðxÞj pxppoig: &
Lemma 8. If the utility functions are strictly concave, every agent of type kAK leaves
the market in finite time with a bundle xk such that ðxkÞkAK is a Walrasian allocation.
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Proof. By strict concavity of utility functions, the market equilibrium outcome is a
degenerate lottery, so each agent of type kAK receives in equilibrium the bundle xk;
the unique maximizer of his utility over the equilibrium budget set through ok: &
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
5. Extensions
The theorem proved in this paper can be extended in several important directions.
1. Strict monotonicity can be weakened to local non-satiation, since it is used only
to ﬁnd near-by strictly preferred bundles in the separation argument of Lemma 6 and
in the use of the ﬁrst welfare theorem in Lemma 7. This allows to extend the theory
to ‘‘economic bads’’ if one considers the consumption set to be RL; to avoid
problems with the boundary assumption on preferences.
2. Strict concavity, used only in Lemma 8, can be replaced with the assumption of
aggregate risk aversion introduced in [2]. This assumption takes advantage of the
convexiﬁcation effects in the continuum. As explained in that paper, aggregate risk
aversion can be derived from assumptions on individual preferences, by requiring a
weak form of concavity on the quasiconcave covers of utility functions.
3. There is another sense in which the convexifying effects of the continuum help
relaxing assumptions. Although we have assumed convexity of individual preference
relations for the proof of Lemma 6, all is really needed is the convexity of the sum of
preferred sets to make the separation argument go through. Assuming only that, one
can adapt the proof of Proposition 1 in [8] to prove the existence of a unique
separating price. That proof relies on differentiability, but it can be extended as
follows. Using the notation in their proof, if at periods t and t; there are two
different supporting prices pt and pt; we can have two cases: (a) if pt intersects the
relevant preferred set at period t or pt intersects that at period t; one can use the
same deviation proposed in McLennan and Sonnenschein’s proof to ﬁnd a
contradiction; and (b) if that does not happen, both prices support both relevant
preferred sets, and then we might as well choose one of them as our separating
price.
4. Lemma 7 rests on an assumption made directly on the equilibrium. A sufﬁcient
condition for it is that there is at least one type with differentiable preferences
because then the set A is smooth at 0. This minimal presence of differentiability is
not necessary, though we have constructed examples with all preferences being non-
differentiable in which all market equilibria have the Walrasian property. We choose
to state the assumption as in Lemma 7 because it is a necessary condition for the
theorem to hold. That is, using the notation found in the statement of Lemma 7,
suppose the assumption were violated: this means that there would exist an
equilibrium for which there exists a characteristic i with pzio0: It follows then that
the equilibrium outcome cannot be Walrasian, since at least characteristic i does not
end up consuming his Walrasian bundle. (This argument shows that there is a large
number of conditions that are necessary for the theorem; essentially, any statement
with a preamble of the form ‘‘for every characteristic i such that pzio0:’’ The
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advantage of the assumption of Lemma 7 is that, apart from necessary, it is also
sufﬁcient.)
5. The ‘‘ﬁnite type’’ assumption has been made only for expositional reasons.
Alternatively, one could work with the condition of dispersed characteristics, as in
[3]. Increasing the diversity of types in the population can only help the arguments of
the proof, as long as there is a positive probability of meeting agents with a bundle in
an open ball of a given bundle.
6. The theory extends also to indivisible goods, thereby reconciling the result in the
limit with the limit theorem of Gale [6]. To do this, one should convexify the
consumption set and work with the quasiconcave covers of utility functions, as done
in [2]. Our key argument is based on separation and this can be attained following
similar steps to the ones in our proof.
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